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DISSENT FROM THE UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMMISSION'S 
PROPOSED GUIDELINES 
Paul H. Robinson* 
The United States Sentencing Commission's proposed guidelines ap­
peared in January, 1987. ** Commissioner Paul H. Robinson dis­
sented strongly from those proposed guidelines. His dissenting 
opinion follows. 
I believe that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,1 which cre­
ated the United States Sentencing Commission, contains two main 
directives. First, the Commission's guidelines must provide a ra­
tional and principled sentencing system2 that will further the pur­
poses of just punishment and crime control.3 Second, the 
guidelines must reduce unwarranted disparity among sentences for 
similar offenders who commit similar offenses.4 The Act provides 
"' Commissioner, United States Sentencing Commission; Adjunct Professor, Ge­
orgetown Law Center; Distinguished Professor, Rutgers School of Law-Camden. Di­
ploma of Legal Studies, Cambridge University Law Faculty, 1976; LL.M., Harvard Law 
School, 1974; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1973; B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic lnstitme, 
1970. 
""" The Commission's final guidelines are scheduled to be promulgated in April, 
1987. 
I Sentencing Reform Act, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as 18 U.S.C. 3551 et seq. 
and 28 U.S.C. 991 et seq.). 
2 "For the first time, the Federal law will assure that the Federal criminal justice 
system will adhere to a consistent sentencing philosophy." S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 
1st Sess. 59 ( 1983) (hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 225). "The formulation of sentenc­
ing guidelines and policy statements will provide an unprecedented opportunity in the 
Federal system to look at sentencing patterns as a whole to assure that sentences im­
posed are consistent with the purposes of sentencing." S. Rep. No. 225 at 51. 
3 See 28 U.S.C. 991 (b)( l )  (directing the Commission to establish sentencing policies 
and practices that assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 
U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)-just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation). 
4 See 28 U.S.C. 99 l (b)( l )(B) (directing the Commission to establish sentencing poli­
cies and practices that "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sen­
tencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar 
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct . .. "). See also 18 U.S.C. 
3553(a)(6) (directing the court "to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among de­
fendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct."). "These 
provisions underline the major premise of the sentencing guidelines-the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparity." S. Rep. No. 225 at 78. 
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that these objectives are to be achieved through the Commission's 
promulgation of a comprehensive sentencing system that will bind 
all federal judges.5 I opposed the Commission's Preliminary Draft 
of September, 1986,6 because I saw it as lacking both guiding princi­
ples and an effective means of reducing disparity. While the Com­
mission's current proposed guidelines differ from the Preliminary 
Draft in many important respects, like its predecessor, this draft is 
not guided by rational unifying principles and it will not reduce sen­
tencing disparity. Further, the current proposed guidelines trans­
gress specific statutory limitations on the Commission's authority. 
Because I believe that the proposal violates both the intent and the 
letter of the Sentencing Reform Act, I cannot in good faith join the 
other members of the Commission in support of the proposed 
guidelines. 
I. A RATIONAL AND PRINCIPLED SENTENCING SYSTEM? 
Neither of the Commission's guidelines was drafted with a co­
herent, articulated sentencing philosophy in mind. Rather, the 
drafting was done in an ad hoc manner without the guidance of any 
set of sentencing principles. The inevitable result of this approach 
is guidelines that are haphazard and internally inconsistent, and that 
frequently generate improper results; they simply do not consist­
ently and rationally distinguish cases according to relevant offense 
and offender characteristics. 
A comparison of possible guideline sentences for different of­
fenses illustrates one difficulty. Is it appropriate that the sentence 
for aggravated fish smuggling can be greater than that for armed 
bank robbery?7 that the sentence for aggravated forcible sexual con-
5 The three key provisions of the Act work together: First, the guidelines are to take 
into account the relevant offense and offender characteristics. 28 U.S.C. 994(c)-(d). 
The legislative history directs that the guidelines should "reflect every important factor 
relevant to sentencing." S. Rep. No. 225 at 169 (emphasis added). Second, for each 
combination of relevant offense and offender characteristics, the maximum of the im­
prisonment range may not exceed the minimum of that range by more than 25%. 28 
U .S.C. 994(b). See also H.R. Rep. No. 614, 99th Con g., 2d Sess. 4 ( 1986) ("If a guideline 
calls for imprisonment, the maximum term of imprisonment called for in the guideline 
cannot exceed the minimum term by more than 25% of the minimum."). Finally, a 
judge cannot deviate from the guideline range "unless the court finds that an aggravat­
ing or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration by 
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines .... " 18 U.S.C. 3553(b). See 
also S. Rep. No. 225 at 150 ("It is expected that most sentences will fall within the ranges 
recommended in the sentencing guidelines."). 
6 Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 35,080 (1986). 
7 Aggravated fish smuggling: Chapter Two, sections Q226 (Level 6), Q226(a)( I) 
( +3 Levels), (a)(2) ( +3 Levels), (a)(3) ( +5 Levels), (a)(4) ( +8 Levels), (Total = Level 
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tact with a 13-year-old child can be less that that for submitting a 
false record on protected wildlife?8 that the sentence for some 
antitrust violations can be less than that for failure to surrender a 
naturalization certificate ?9 that the sentence for involuntary man­
slaughter can be less than that for impersonating a government em­
ployee?10 that the sentence for inciting a riot can be less than that 
for altering a motor vehicle ID number?11 The fact of the matter is 
that the Commission never systematically ranked offenses. 
Further difficulties arise from the guidelines' peculiar two-track 
structure under which the same factor is in some instances treated 
under a specific offense guideline and in other instances under a 
general provision. Consider, for example, the discharge of a fire­
arm. If it is discharged during an assault, the specific assault adjust­
ments apply and the judge need not increase the sentence at all but 
may increase it by 3 months.I2 If, however, the discharge occurs 
during serious property destruction, the general adjustment applies 
and the judge must increase the sentence by 3 times that amount (9 
25, maximum 71 months). Armed bank robbery: Chapter Two, sections B231 (Level 
20), B23 l (a)(l )  ( +3 Levels), (a)(2) ( +2 Levels) (Total 25, minimum 57 months). 
8 Aggravated forcible sexual contact with a 13-year old child: Chapter Two, sec­
tions A233 (Level 6), A233(a)( l )  ( +2 Levels), (a)(2) ( +3 Levels) (Total= Level 11, 
minimum 8 months). Submitting a false record on protected wildlife: Chapter Two, 
sections Q222(2) (Level 4), Q222(a)(3) ( + 5 Levels), (a)(4) ( + 3 Levels) (Total = Level 
12, maximum 16 months). 
9 Some antitrust violations: Chapter Two, section R221 (Level 6, minimum 0 
months). Failure to surrender a naturalization certificate: Chapter Two, section L225 
(Level 6, maximum 6 months). 
10 Involuntary manslaughter: Chapter Two, section A216 (Level 10, minimum 6 
months). Impersonating a government employee: Chapter Two, section J214 (Level 
12, maximum 16 months). 
II Inciting a riot: Chapter Two, section K24 l (Level 7, minimum 1 month). Altering 
a motor vehicle ID number: Chapter Two, section B26l (Level 10, maximum 12 
months). 
12 
Assault 
(A22 l )  
Offense Level 
15 
Sentencing Range 
(in months) 
18-24 
Discharge of a gun during assault + l = 16 21-27 
(A221 (a)( 1)) 
The sentence for discharging a gun during an assault may be increased by 3 
months (27 minus 24). 
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months) and may increase it by 7 times that amount (21 months).13 
Difficulties also arise from the use of invited or directed "depar­
tures" from the guidelines. For example, if an offender's prior con­
viction is similar to the offense at hand, it is suggested that a 
sentence at the high end of the guideline range may be appropri­
ate.14 However, if the same prior misconduct did not result in a 
conviction, the judge is specifically invited to exceed the guideline 
range.15 Similarly, a recent similar offense-e.g., a 3 year old assault 
conviction-may increase the guideline sentence by 3 months.16 If 
the same conviction is over 10 years old, however, the court is in­
vited to exceed the guideline range without limit.17 
Perhaps more troubling is the basic question: are such invited 
or directed "departures" permitted by the Sentencing Reform Act? 
If a judge follows an invitation or direction to depart from the 
guidelines, is the sentence subject to appellate review, as are all de­
viations from the guidelines?18 Or, is the sentence free from appel­
late review because the sentence is precisely what the guidelines 
invite or direct? The status of the Commission's "guidelines to go 
outside the guidelines" is futher complicated by its attempt to regu­
late judges after they accept the invitation to depart. The extent of 
the permissible "departure" may be limited, to "not more than 4 
levels," for example.19 One may wonder how such a "departure 
range" is different from a "guideline range" of 4 levels (a range of 
between 118% and 300%),20 which is illegal.21 By calling a guide-
13 
Property Destruction (B2 l 3) 
more than $500,00 I damage (B213(a)(2)) 
Discharge of a gun during serious property 
destruction (Y226) 
Offense Level 
4 
+9 = 13 
+5 = 18 
Sentencing Range 
12-18 
27-33 
The minimum increase for discharging a gun during serious property destruction 
is 9 months (27 minus 18) and the maximum is 21 months (33 minus 12). 
14 See Chapter Three, section A314 (Similar Prior Convictions). 
15 See Chapter Three, section A313 (Similar Misconduct). 
16 An assault offender (Chapter Two, section A22 l ,  Level 15) with no criminal his­
tory (Criminal History Category I, Chapter Three, section A3 l l ) would have a senenc­
ing range of 18-24 months. The same offender with a 3 year old assault conviction 
(Criminal History Category II, Chapter Three, section A3 l l  (c)) would have a sentencing 
range of 21-27 months. In other words, because of the prior assault conviction, the 
court may increase the sentence by up to 3 months (27 minus 24). 
17 See Chapter Three, Commentary to section A312(e) (Applicable Time Period). 
18 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3), (b)(3) (directing that sentences outside the guidelines 
are subject to applicable review). 
19 Chapter Two, section Y218 (Diminished Capacity). 
20 See note 31, infra. 
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b), quoted at note 5, supra. 
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line directive a "departure" (a term that does not appear in the Sen­
tencing Reform Act), can the Commission escape from the 25% 
statutory limitation on the permissible width of a guideline range? 
Or, one may wonder, can a judge "depart" from a guideline that 
directs "departure"? If a judge refuses to depart when so directed, 
is his refusal to depart subject to appellate review? 
While the proposed draft obviously does not generate peculiar 
results in all cases, it is all too easy to find difficulties like those 
noted above. The true significance of these examples is not the par­
ticular problems that they present, but rather that they manifest an 
unsystematic approach to the complex task of guideline drafting. It 
is an approach that has produced a flawed structure and drafting of 
mixed quality. 
II. REDUCTION OF DISPARI1Y? 
In both the proposed draft and the Preliminary Draft, the Com­
mission has failed to meet its obligation to reduce unwarranted sen­
tencing disparity. The earlier Preliminary Draft failed because, 
while it attempted to meet the legislative mandate of a comprehen­
sive sentencing system,22 it was not structured in a way that could 
effectively accommodate the wide variety of possible cases. The 
draft tried to account for some specific combinations of offense and 
offender characteristics yet ignored many others and failed to pro­
vide a general framework that made application feasible. The result 
was a complex, inconsistent, and unworkable document. The Pre­
liminary Draft was like a Volkswagen "Bug" trying to pull a fully­
loaded three-axle trailer. While it made an earnest effort, it was sim­
ply not powerful enough to do the job. 
Unfortunately, when it became clear that the Preliminary Draft 
could not effectively implement a comprehensive system, the Com­
mission's response was not to continue work toward designing a 
more flexible and workable comprehensive system. Instead, it aban­
doned the legislative mandate. Rather than trying to find a diesel 
cab to pull the trailer, the Commission decided to keep the "Bug" 
and dump the load. 
It may well be possible to pull the trailer with the "Bug" be­
cause not much is required of guidelines that simply tell the judge to 
exercise discretion. And that is essentially what the Commission's 
22 For example, then Attorney General William French Smith testified at Congres­
sional hearings that the Sentencing Reform Act was to introduce "a totally new and 
comprehensive sentencing system that is based upon a coherent philosophy." S. Rep. 
No. 225 at 38. 
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current draft does. The guideline ranges for specific offenses are 
frequently far in excess of the 25% permitted by statute, and are so 
broad-as much as 600% and more-as to be of no practical value. 
Further, the offense ranges may be subject to one or more general 
adjustments, each of which gives the judge further discretion. 
For example, for making illegal payments to influence the ac­
tions of a union official, Judge X can, under the guidelines, give the 
offender 12 months, while Judge Y, applying the same guidelimes in the 
same case, can give the offender 60 months (a range of 400%).23 The 
offender who leads a prison riot can get 21 months from Judge X 
and 108 months from Judge Y (a range of 414%), both under the guide­
lines. 24 The offender who bribes a federal legislator in order to in­
fluence his vote can get 8 months from Judge X and 57 months from 
Judge Y (a range of 612%), both under the guidelines.25 
Similarly, the offender who supervises the distribution of ob­
scene matter for sale can get 2 months, or probation, from Judge X 
and 33 months from Judge Y (a range of 1550%), both under the guide­
lines.26 If he is convicted of two counts, Judge X can impose concur­
rent sentences for a total term of 2 months, or probation, while 
Judge Y can impose consecutive sentences for a total term of 66 
months (a range of 3200% ), both under the guidelines.27 The offender 
who is convicted of twice selling stolen guns to a known felon can 
get 10 months from Judge X and 82 months fromJudge Y (a range 
of720%), both under the guidelines.28 As long as the sentence is within 
the guidelines, it is not subject to appellate review.29 
The examples above are not uncommon; 70% of the 20 most 
prosecuted offense have one or more ranges in excess of the 25% 
range authorized by statute. The average of these excessive ranges 
23 Making illegal payments to influence the actions of union official: Chapter Two, 
section E259 (Levels 6-12), E259(a)( l )  ( + 6 Levels), (a)(2) ( + 1-6 Levels) (Total = 
Levels 13-24, 12-60 months). (The guidance sentence of 63 months is limited by the 
statutory maximum of 60 months.) 
24 Leading a prison riot: Chapter Two, sections P215 (Level 15-23), Z211 (+ 1-6 
Levels) (Total = Levels 16-29, 21-108 months). 
25 Bribing a federal legislator to influence vote: Chapter Two, sections C211 (Levels 
10-15), C2ll (a)(1) (+1-8 Levels) (Total= Levels 11-23, 8-57 months). 
26 Supervising distribution of obscene matter for sale: Chapter Two, sections G231 
(Level 6), G231(a)( l )  (+1-6 Levels), Z211 (+1-6 Levels) (Total= Levels 8-18, 2-33 
months). 
27 Chapter Five, sections A56l et seq. (Consecutive and Concurrent Sentences of 
Imprisonment). 
28 Chapter Two, sections K223 (Level 9), K223(a)(2) (+2-7 Levels), (a)(4) (+l -4 
Levels); Chapter Five, sections A561 et seq. (Total = Levels 12-20, 10-82 months). 
29 Parties can appeal a sentence that is within the guidelines only if the sentence is 
illegal (18 U.S.C. 3742(a)( l )  and (b)( I)) or if the sentence was imposed as a result of an 
incorrect application of the guidelines (18 U.S.C. 3742(a)(2) and (b)(2)). 
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is well over 600%.30 In addition to these offense ranges, general 
adjustments provide other sources of broad discretion: e.g., a range 
of increase between 118% and 300% (depending on the seriousness 
of the offense) is available to account for an offender's role in the 
offense (also available is a range of decrease between 118% and 
300%); a range between 56% and 166% is available if the offender 
acknowledges responsibility for the offense (as through a plea of 
guilty); and a range of between 74% and 200% is available if the 
offender obstructed the investigation of the case or lied at the 
trial.31 Further, in every case of multiple counts the judge has com­
plete discretion in deciding whether to impose concurrent or con­
secutive sentences.32 At least one such opportunity for additional 
broad discretion is likely to exist in nearly every case.33 
As if the discretion within the guidelines were not enough, in 
over 100 instances the propsed guidelines or their official commen­
taries invite or direct judges to depart from the guidelines and to 
exercise their own complete, unguided and frequently unlimited 
discretion. 34 General rules invite or direct judges to depart from 
30 See Appendix A. 
The average of all of the ranges applicable to the 20 most prosecuted offenses is, by 
my calculations, 232% (See Appendix B). The Commission has not yet developed infor­
mation on such matters. I believe that it is critical, however, to determine the percent­
age of all cases for which, in practice, the applicable range will be in excess of the 25% 
authorized by statute and the percentage of cases that are likely to result in departures. 
Another important research project is determining the impact of the proposed guide­
lines on the prison population. This legislatively-required study will be difficult if not 
impossible for guidelines that are so discretionary. 
31 
Range 
l-6 (role in the offense: 
Z211) 
1-4 (obstructing the 
investigation: 
C3 l l ) 
1-3 (acceptance of 
responsibility: 
C321) 
% at Offense Level lO 
300 
200 
166 
% at Offense Level 36* 
118 
74 
56 
*Offense level 36 was selected because it is the highest level at which it is not 
possible to impose a life sentence. 
32 See Chapter Five, sections A561 et seq. (Consecutive and Concurrent Sentences of 
Imprisonment). 
33 For example, 87% of all federal criminal cases are settled by plea agreement and, 
of those that go to trial, 63% end in multiple counts of conviction and thus permit the 
use of the broad concurrent-consecutive discretion. Plea information from the 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 4 76 (1985). Multiple count information de­
rived from a cross-tabulation of method of disposition by number of counts using U.S. 
Sentencing Commission FPSSIS data. (Complete compilation available upon request). 
34 Complete list of departures available upon request. 
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the guidelines when the offender: had an additional criminal pur­
pose;35 has a drug dependency leading to an increased propensity to 
commit crimes;36 disrupted a governmental function;37 endangered 
the public welfare;38 engaged in ongoing criminal conduct;39 de­
rived a substantial portion of income from criminal activity;40 en­
gaged in a pattern of violent criminal conduct41 or a pattern of civil 
or administrative violations;42 cooperated with authorities;43 or has 
a criminal history score that, in the court's view, does not adequately 
reflect the seriousness of his past criminal conduct.44 
Instead, the judge is told that departure is appropriate if the 
adjustment range of the guidelines is, in the judge's view, "inade­
quate."45 And, as if this were still not enough, judges are told that 
in cases where the sentence is pursuant to a plea aggreement-a 
common occurrence in the federal system-they are not bound by 
the guidelines.46 
The effect of the current draft is simply this: nearly any prison 
term that might be imposed presently can be imposed after these 
guidelines go into effect. I do not believe that this is what the Sen­
tencing Reform Act intends, or permits.47 
Some people argue that we ought not try to reduce the disparity 
through comprehensive, binding sentencing guidelines. Many wit-
35 See Chapter Two, section Y216 (Criminal Purpose). 
36 See Chapter Three, section D314 (Physical Condition, Including Drug Dependence 
and Alcohol Abuse). 
37 See Chapter Two, section Y212 (Disruption of Governmental Function). 
38 See Chapter Two, section Y215 (Public Welfare). 
39 See Chapter Three, Commentary to section A3 l l (Criminal History Category). 
40 See Chapter Three, section A316 (Criminal Livelihood). 
41 See Chapter Three, Commentary to section A311 (Criminal History Category). 
42 See Chapter Three, Commentary to section A311 (Criminal History Category). 
43 See Chapter Three, section C331 (Cooperation). 
44 See Chapter Three, section A315 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category). 
45 See Chapter Two, Introduction. 
This appears to be in direct conflict with the Sentencing Reform Act. Under the 
Act, judges may not deviate from the guidelines simply because, in their view, the guide­
line range is not adequate (e.g., because it does not allow the sentence that they want to 
give). The statute permits deviation only if an aggravating or mitigating circumstance 
exists that was not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. 3553(b). If 
the judge wants to deviate from the guideline range because of a factor already fully 
considered by the Commission, the statute would bar his deviation but the guidelines 
attempt to permit it. 
46 See Chapter Four, section A412(b)(2) (Plea Agreements). 
47 It is not enough, of course, for the Commission to simply remove this discretion 
from these proposed guidelines. That might avoid some of the illegalities of the current 
draft but it would only increase, dramatically, the number of inappropriate sentences. 
The solution is to be found, instead, in the construction of a rational system that defines 
its principles of sentencing and implements them through a sophisticated and workable 
structure. 
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nesses before the Commission suggested precisely this.48 But this 
issue was hotly debated in Congress and, with passage of the Sen­
tencing Reform Act, was resolved in favor of binding and compre­
hensive guidelines. Until the Commission has explored all possible 
methods of performing the Legislature's mandate, it ought not 
abandon the assigned task. 
More importantly, if the Commission ultimately concludes that 
it cannot perform its task, or at least not in the time alloted, it ought 
to admit this openly, report to Congress accordingly, and, perhaps, 
ask for an extension of time.49 The Commission should not promul-
48 One federal judge commented: 
I see no objection to telling Congress in a preliminary report: "Ladies and gentle­
men, we [the Sentencing Commission] cannot [draft sentencing guidelines] until we 
have a rational scheme of statutes and until you give us a certain degree of play. 
Congress may well have made a mistake, and [our attempting the task gives] us the 
wisdom to make a suggestion for the modification of the statute." You know, I 
found that in World War II that when a soldier is ordered to shoot somebody that 
should not be shot, there is the possibility, in extreme circumstances, of turning 
around and saying, "Don't you think you ought to think about it, Lieutenant, before 
you order me in there to shoot?'' I think maybe you ought to do that to Congress. 
Judge Jack Weinstein, Testimony before the United States Sentencing Commission, 
Public Hearing, New York, New York, pp. 34-35 (Oct. 21, 1986) (transcript from the 
United States Sentencing Commission). See also testimony of Judge Mark Wolf, id., at 62. 
("I think Congress had goals and they thought this [the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984] 
would be a means to achieve those goals. But if the intense scutiny, and really in many 
respects, I think, brilliant analysis, indicates that in effect mandatory sentencing is not 
the right way, the best way, to approach those goals, but an effective presumptive sen­
tencing would be, I myself would think that the sponsors of the original legislation 
would be quite responsive to you [the Commission] and that their colleagues, too, would 
be responsive. Is the old system better than this system [the Commission's Preliminary 
Draft Guidelines]? I think so."). 
49 In a January, 1987 memorandum to the Commission, I suggested that "if the op­
portunity for legislation arises in the near future, I would propose that we ask for the 
statutory deadline to be reset to April 1989" based on the following: 
Policy development (some of this work has already been done) 
Execution of policy decisions (and policy revision) 
4 months 
7 months 
Preliminary Testing: 
Staff and selected probation officers 
Selected-district field tests: 
Training and set-up 
Testing 
Analysis of results 
Full-scale field testing during "advisory period" 
3 months 
1 month 
4 months 
2 months 
6 months 
(27 months) 
TOTAL 2 years, 3 months 
(assuming that th1s 
process were 
implemented in January, 
1987) 
Memorandum of January 5, 1987, from Paul H. Robinson to all Commissioners, 
"Restructuring and Rescheduling the Commission's Work" (available upon 
request). 
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gate guidelines that only create the illusion of reducing disparity. 
Pretending to have disparity-reducing guidelines is worse than hav­
ing no guidelines at all. Once the guidelines go into effect, the 
United States Parole Commission-the single source of uniformity 
under current practice, unsatisfactory as it may be-will expire 
under the terms of the Sentencing Reform Act. 50 
I have always applauded the Sentencing Reform Act's abolition 
of early release on parole and, accordingly, abolition of the Parole 
Commission, for this moves us toward honesty in sentencing: the 
sentence publicly imposed by the court would be the sentence 
served. But I assumed, as Congress clearly did in enacting the Sen­
tencing Reform Act, that the Sentencing Commission's guidelines 
would replace and improve upon the disparity-reducing function of 
the Parole Commission.51 Unfortunately, neither of the Commis­
sion's efforts to date will. Instead, the policies and decision-making 
of the Parole Commission will be replaced by that of 500 plus indi­
vidual sentencing judges with little in the way of guidance or reme­
dial control. It would be an unfortunate irony in the history of 
sentencing reform if the Sentencing Reform Act, enacted to reduce 
disparity, resulted in increased disparity. 
III. COMPLEXITY AND DISCRETION 
My final concern arises from the complexity of the Commis­
sion's proposed guidelines. Some people see the Commission as 
facing the horns of a dilemma: a comprehensive system that will 
reduce disparity appears to require undesirable complexity; on the 
other hand, given the great variety of cases, the only alternative to 
complexity is broad discretion and its concomitant disparity. In its 
current proposal, the Commission has chosen to impale itself 
squarely on both horns. The guidelines are overwhelmingly com­
plex yet, in the end, they simply defer to the discretion of judges 
and plea-bargain negotiators. 
The Commission's approach of providing both complexity and 
discretion may well have some political value. Without close exami­
nation, one might take the complexity as evidence of significant re­
straints on discretion, the desired result for those who supported 
50 18 u.s.c. 235(b)(1). 
51 The United States Sentencing Commission currently sets prison release dates 
outside its �idelines in about 20 percent of the cases in Its jurisdiction. It is antici­
pated that Judges will impose sentences outside the sentencing guidelines at about 
the same rate or possibly at a somewhat lower rate since the sentencing guidelines 
should contain recommendations of appropriate sentences for more detailed com­
binations of offense and offender characteristics than do the parole guidelines. 
S. Rep. No. 225 at 52 n. 71 (citation omitted). 
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the Sentencing Reform Act. At the same time, those who prefer a 
discretionary system will be pleased with how the system really 
works. In addition, if the Commission is not capable of creating a 
sufficiently sophisticated sentencing system, there is value in defer­
ring to judicial discretion in order to avoid the imposition of im­
proper sentences. I understand both of these points. The 
Commission has been given an extremely difficult task and asked to 
perform it quickly under the bright lights generated by strong and 
conflicting political interests. Nonetheless, a complex and discre­
tionary system would have unacceptable consequences that would 
set back the cause of federal sentencing reform. 
Having concluded that the proposed guidelines are not ration­
ally calculated to impose just punishment and to reduce crime, and 
that they are likely to increase rather than decrease unwarranted dis­
parity, I must, regrettably, oppose the proposed guidelines, as I op­
posed the Preliminary Draft. 
I dissent. 
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APPENDIX A 
AvAILABLE RANGES FoR THE 20 MosT PROSECUTED OFFENSES 
Rank• U.S.C. Section Offense D escription Guideline Section(s) %Range .. 
l 21 u.s.c. 841 manufacture, distribute, D2 ll X 
dispense, create 
controlled/ counterfeited 
substance 
2 21 u.s.c. 846 attempt/conspiracy of the 0218 X 
above 
3 18 u.s.c. 2113 bank robbery & incidental B2ll (2 ll3(b)) llOO 
crimes B22l (2113(a)) X 
4 21 u.s.c. 844 simple possession 0221 162.5 
200 
1100 
5 18 u.s.c. 1341 mail frauds & swindles F2 ll 500 
350 
275 
6 18 U.S.C. 641 embezzling, stealing, B2ll llOO 
converting public property 
or money 
7 18 u.s.c. 656 theft, embezzlement, or B2ll 1100 
misapplication by bank 
officer or employee 
8 18 u.s.c. 1001 falsifying government or F211 500 
records or statements 350 
generally 275 
9 8 U .S.C. 1324 bringing in and harboring L211 X 
aliens 
10 18 u.s.c. 1708 theft or receipt of stolen B211 1100 
mail matter generally 
11 21 u.s.c. 955 possession of drugs on 0211 X 
board vessels 
12 18 u.s.c. 495 make, utter, alter, or transfer B251 (counterfeit) 1500 
false contracts, deeds, or B252 (forgery) IIOO 
powers of attorney 
13 21 u.s.c. 843 fraudulent drug distribution 0221 (843(a)(3 )) 162.5 
200 
1100 
0231-233 (843(a)) X 
0211 (843 )  X 
14 18 u.s.c. 2314 transporting stolen goods, B211 1100 
securities, moneys, fradulent 
state tax stamps or articles 
used in counterfeiting 
15 21 u.s.c. 952 importing controlled 0211 X 
substances 
16 26 u.s.c. 7201 tax evasion T211 125 
17 26 u.s.c. 7203 failure to file a tax return T212 500 
18 18 u.s.c. 1202 receiving, possessing, A242 X 
disposing ransom money 
19 7 U.S.C . 2024(B ) unauthorized use of food F211 (addressed in 500 
stamps commentary only) 350 
275 
B2ll (addressed in 1100 
commentary only) 
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Guideline Guideline 
Rank U.S.C. Section '?oRanges* Rank U.S.C. Section '?oRanges* 
25 18 18 u.s.c. 1202 25 
162.5 19 7 U.S.C. 2024(B) 25 
200 25 
1100 25 
25 25 
25 500 
25 350 
25 275 
25 25 
25 25 
14 18 u.s.c. 2314 25 600 
25 25 
600 600 
25 llOO 
600 25 
1100 20 18 u.s.c. 1701 25 
25 25 
15 21 u.s.c. 952 25 600 
25 25 
25 600 
16 26 u.s.c. 7201 25 1100 
125 25 
17 26 U.S.C. 7203 25 25 
500 166 
Average: The average sentencing range for the 20 most-prosecuted crimes is 232.34'?o 
(27 ,881% total divided by 120 guideline provisions). 
* Accounting for each base otlense level and combinations of base offense levels and 
specific offense characteristics found in a guideline section. 
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Rank* U.S.C. Section Offense Description 
20 18 U.S.C. 1701 obstruction of mails 
generally 
Guideline Section(s) % Range* • 
B211 (addressed in II 00 
commentary only) 
H234 (addressed in 166 
commentary only) 
Average: 14 out of the 20 offenses provide a range in base offense levels or specific offense 
characteristics or both. The average percentage of these excessive ranges is 644.11% 
(17,391% total divided by 27 ranges). 
• From FY 85 statistics collected by United States Sentencing Commission from FPSSIS 
data; 18 U.S.C. 13 (Assimilated Crimes) excluded. 
• • Figured from base offense level + largest specific offense characteristic range 
provided. 
APPENDIX B 
PERCENTAGE RANGEs FoR THE 20 MosT PROSECUTED OFFENSES 
Guideline Guideline 
Rank U.S.C. Section % Ranges• Rank U.S.C. Section % Ranges• 
21 u.s.c. 841 25 25 
25 600 
25 25 
2 21 u.s.c. 846 25 600 
3 18 u.s.c. 2113 25 llOO 
25 25 
600 8 18 u.s.c. 1001 25 
25 25 
600 25 
llOO 25 
25 500 
25 350 
25 275 
25 9 8 u.s.c. 1324 25 
25 25 
4 21 U .S.C. 844 25 25 
25 25 
25 10 18 u.s.c. 1708 25 
162.5 25 
200 600 
1100 25 
5 18 u.s.c. 1341 25 600 
25 l lOO 
25 25 
25 II 21 u.s.c. 955 25 
500 25 
350 25 
275 12 18 u.s.c. 495 25 
6 18 u.s.c. 641 25 140 
25 1500 
600 25 
25 25 
600 llOO 
1100 25 
25 13 21 U .S.C. 843 25 
7 18 u.s.c. 656 25 25 
